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Commerce always needs to be institutionally embedded. In institutional economics, it is accepted that the exchange of goods and commodities can only take place when property rights are clearly defined and when enforceable, effective behavioural rules justify the expectation that contractual provisions will be mutually honoured (Richter and Furubotn 2003; Williamson 2005a; Hadfield 2008) . For ordoliberals, these institutions are an essential part of every economic constitution and encapsulated in the term 'transactional law' (Böhm 1933; Behrens 2000) .
While simple, step-by-step economic exchange can be safeguarded without much difficulty, exchange activities in more advanced, and hence complex, economic systems do not necessarily all occur at the same time or in the same place and therefore require more sophisticated, carefully devised safeguards. Numerous historical studies prove that societies have been able to safeguard their transfer orders for quite some time (Greif 1989a (Greif , 1989b (Greif , 2000 (Greif , 2006 Milgrom et al. 1990; North 1991b) . In the Middle Ages, for instance, the European mercantile community was able to formalize trade customs in the generally binding normative framework of the lex mercatoria, which was adjudicated by special mercantile courts. Here the enforcement of rulings was not based on the coercive force of still highly fragmented state authorities, but on the threat of social sanctions in the mercantile reputational networks of guilds and fraternities -sanctions that went all the way to full-scale expulsion.
Only when the nation state emerged in the early modern period did the jurisdiction of civil courts that we are familiar with today begin to take shape. The young states deprived the mercantile courts of their power and brought commercial law under their control (Cutler 2003; Oldham 2004) . On the one hand, this was motivated by the will to demonstrate and strengthen the state monopoly on the use of force. After all, one of the chief objectives fostered by the Enlightenment was the emergence of a civil society in which everyone had the right to pursue a trade regardless of social origin and to engage in economic exchange without the need for support from the exclusive corporative reputational network of the merchant class (Mertens 2010 (Mertens , 2011 . On the other hand, the nationalization of commercial law was essential to meet the requirements of national mass markets, which were expanding rapidly in the wake of industrialization. The outdated mercantile reputational networks could no longer effectively sanction the vast numbers of anonymous actors that operated in national markets (Dietz 2009 (Dietz , 2014 .
Since the early 20th century, moreover, the modern welfare state has fostered the substantive equality of its citizens through civil law, though initially only formal civic equality was sought (Canaris 2000). Today, instruments for the protection of the weak -especially the protection of tenants, consumers and employees -and judicial control of standard form contracts have largely eroded the social base for the ideal of private autonomy as it was propagated by Enlightenment thinkers.
Thus the 'Golden Era' of the welfare state was characterized by ideal-type economic exchange in domestic markets under the protective umbrella of the state private law regime; democratically legitimated statutes and their application by state courts protected all legally relevant issues that might affect ownership and enforced the fulfilment of contracts -if necessary through state compulsory enforcement measures.
Since the mid-20th century, however, trade has increasingly broken free from this nationally embedded institutional framework. With the lowering of political barriers to trade, especially the reduction of duties and tariffs, with the global linking of financial systems and with advances in transport and telecommunications technology, the volume of global cross-border exchange has grown exponentially. State institutions -that is, state law and state courts -increasingly struggle to keep pace with commerce and industry in the transnational realm. International private law and international civil procedural law are currently unable to safeguard economic exchange on the global markets (Schmidt-Trenz 1990; Streit and Mangels 1996; Rodrik 2000; Mertens 2011, 146-53) , and national court decisions cannot presently be enforced elsewhere based on binding international law. Hence cross-border enforcement raises a plethora of practical issues (Hoffmann 2011, 101) . The congruence of economic and legal space has been lost as a consequence (Zürn 1998).
Rather, we observe a kind of self-help movement by merchants in cross-border trade. Referred to as the 'new lex mercatoria', different industries have developed -in close parallel to the institutions that existed before the nationalization of commercial law -substantive behavioural rules and also reputation-based law enforcement instruments (Ellickson 1991; Schmidt-Trenz and Schmidtchen 1991; Streit and Mangels 1996; Dixit 2004; Teubner 2004; Williamson 2005a; Hadfield 2008) . As globalization unfolded, private forms of governance -like relational contracts and reputational networks -came to prevail over state-organized systems of private law. The sheet anchor of the 'shadow of the law' (Dixit 2004) that still is the ultimate
